RCEP

The Final ATC Talking Trade

The Final ATC Talking Trade

It was an exciting time to be in the region.  Governments were enthusiastically signing up to a wide variety of trade agreements.  For example, Laos completed accession procedures to become the 158th member of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  We were in Bhutan for two workshops to support a renewed consideration of joining the WTO.  We also had several training activities in Timor Leste with members of Parliament and across the government to support accession to the WTO in conjunction with plans to become part of ASEAN.  Mongolia, the last WTO member to not have a free trade agreement (FTA), asked for training to complete an FTA with Japan. ASEAN itself was rapidly pursuing greater internal integration, with plans for the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) pushed forward from 2020 to 2015.  It was also working on a range of agreements called ASEAN+1s with major powers in the region including Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea.  There was also a lot of activity to integrate Asia more closely to the rest of the world.  The first meeting in what would become the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) took place in Singapore on the sidelines of APEC.  The TPP, as regular Talking Trade readers will recall, rapidly expanded and finally concluded in 2014.  The European Union was actively involved in working with members of ASEAN to create an eventual bloc-to-bloc agreement, starting with a bilateral FTA with Singapore.

Asia’s Response to the Collapsing Consensus on Trade

Asia’s Response to the Collapsing Consensus on Trade

Recent events have not been kind to fans of global trade.  Growing discontent with the status quo, particularly by major powers in the system like the United States, has led to a range of policy actions that would have been unthinkable just a decade ago.  The disruptions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic further shattered consensus over what constitutes acceptable actions by governments.  National security concerns are increasingly dominating economic decisions. In this rapidly evolving landscape, the global trade system is facing at least three major challenges.  First, global leadership has been in short supply with significantly less enthusiasm for supporting past trade practices and solutions.  Second, the proliferation of new trade arrangements comes with a growing risk of further trade splintering.  Finally, if past practices are increasingly seen as inadequate, there is limited agreement on what sort of alternative arrangements might be better fit for purpose. Asia plays a pivotal role in designing outcomes for the future.  This highly trade-dependent region has relied on the bedrock created by the World Trade Organization (WTO) to ensure trade lanes remain open and the use of broadly consistent rules to help govern trade.  Connecting to others via trade does not solve all problems, but it remains a critical tool for driving growth and economic development.  Now the WTO is stuck, with the consensus-based organization largely unable to move ahead on most of its agenda.  Other than an agreement on trade facilitation, the WTO has not managed to get any new trade rules or market liberalization in place since 1995.  Even the so-called “crown jewel” of the WTO, the dispute settlement system, has now been broken for several years. Restoring the multilateral system is an urgent priority, however, there is limited agreement on how to make it happen. 

The Year Ahead: 2023 for Asian Trade

The Year Ahead: 2023 for Asian Trade

It’s that time of year again—ready to gaze into a crystal ball and guess the 2023 future of trade in Asia?  The overall picture looks mixed, with continuing disruptions which may be offset by new opportunities. 

Continuing Covid impact: while much of the world (and probably all Talking Trade readers) seem eager to put the Covid-19 pandemic in the rear-view mirror, the virus is likely to continue to affect trade in Asia for much of 2023.  Disruptions will be caused by individuals that are continuing to get sick and are unable to report for work.  Fluctuating staffing levels can make it difficult for companies to deliver goods and services on time as intended.  These delays will continue to reverberate across the region and create continuing headaches for supply chain managers, particularly in the first half of the year.  As with the earlier waves of Covid, government reactions and responses to potentially rising infection levels are also important.  While complete border shutdowns may be a thing of the past, governments have shown a new willingness to make rapid adjustments to policies that can catch firms by surprise.  

Inflation and recession worries:  The jury remains out on whether inflationary pressures are going to sharply or modestly moderate in the near term, but there is a growing consensus that several major economies are still poised for recession.  Given the importance of key markets in the US and Europe to most Asian economies, even a mild recession in either can be quite damaging.  Inflation and rising interest rates are also posing new challenges to domestic firms and consumers. 

Uncertain supply and demand:  Firms in Asia are also grappling with continuing uncertainty about the supply and demand for goods and services in the near term.  Many of the economic patterns developed during covid, such as working from home or extensive shopping online, will change in 2023.  But the “new normal” is also unlikely to snap back to pre-covid times.  This leaves firms and supply chain managers facing a set of forecasts that are probably obsolete and few clear answers on what sorts of supply and demand pressures might be most relevant now.  High levels of uncertainty make it all too easy for firms to over or undershoot expectations, leading to mountains of unsold inventory, staffing levels which are not right sized, or an inability to deliver at volumes.

Missing in Action: Trade Secretariats

Missing in Action: Trade Secretariats

Secretariats, or a permanent management structure, play a critical role in the delivery and implementation of international agreements including trade deals. They provide the backbone to administer the day-to-day functions of keeping such pacts alive and ensuring that parties stick to their obligations. Secretariats come in all shapes, sizes and levels of formality. Running an institution by informal committees alone can be a recipe for allowing members to shirk their implementation commitments. It is highly likely that many of the benefits of trade agreements will go unrealized. Countries in the region are signing on to a host of often overlapping free trade agreements (FTAs), creating a so-called “noodle bowl” effect in trade parlance; but a number of them have no permanent structures in place to monitor the agreements. Almost a year after entering into force, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), despite having provisions requiring the creation of a Secretariat as the very first order of business, has yet to set up one.

Congressional Testimony: Trade Policies in Asia

Congressional Testimony: Trade Policies in Asia

The trade and economic landscape in Asia is rapidly evolving. While there are many activities that I could mention, I will focus my testimony today on four regional trade arrangements: the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP); the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP); a set of digital trade deals known as DEPA or DEAs; and the upcoming American-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). I will attempt to explain how and why these agreements matter for Asia and describe some of the implications of this evolving regional architecture for the United States. I will conclude with a few brief suggestions about how craft an IPEF that best fits into a complex economic landscape. Let me begin with the CPTPP. The CPTPP came into force in late December 2018 and now has eight active members: Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. The UK is in the middle of accession talks and hopes to be part of the group by the end of this year. Three additional formal letters of application were received last fall, from China, Taiwan, and Ecuador. South Korea’s outgoing government pledged to submit an accession request this month. There are three important items on the CPTPP agenda for this year: members must review the agreement; conclude accession negotiations with the UK; and decide on a process for addressing pending applications.